Tuesday, April 04, 2006

Welcome to the Hall of Presidents.

There's only one reason anyone ever heard of the Sphex wasp. When it lays its eggs, it builds a burrow and stuffs a caterpillar into it, to serve as food for its eggs. But if you steal the caterpillar while the wasp is building the burrow, the wasp will go through the motions of putting the caterpillar into the burrow and burying it, oblivious to the fact that it's accomplishing nothing.

Daniel Dennett points to the Sphex as the decisive argument in the debate over determinism and free will. Free will, he declares, lies in the ability to recognize futility. The Sphex can't recognize the futility of its actions because it's like a little clockwork automaton, going through preprogrammed motions. Humans, on the other hand, can recognize futility, so they have free will.

Has Dennett glimpsed the truth? He has, but he has only glimpsed it, and that glimpse has sent him fleeing to hide under the quilt from the monster that lurks under his very bed- the monster of COGNITIVE DISSONANCE! For Dennett cannot permit himself to see the obvious- that he lives in a world full of clockwork people, devoid of free will as they rattle along their tracks!

Do you want proof? Read War Stars: the Super Weapon and the American Imagination, by H. Bruce Franklin, mighty god of the Pantheon of Perspicaciousness, arrayed in lightning and thunderbolts!* Gaze upon it, and despair!

Franklin's history of strategic bombing, in a nutshell: roughly 80 years ago, the military establishment became convinced that strategic bombing was the ultimate weapon to end all wars. In World War II, America tried to defeat Japan by incinerating every single Japanese city with incendiary bombing. That didn't work, so they tried incinerating a few Allied cities- specifically, Japanese-held Chinese cities. That didn't work either. Then they had an idea. Obliterating cities with squadrons of bombers wasn't working, but what if they could obliterate a city with a single bomber? That's the ticket! Then they built the atomic bomb. Truman, in his infinite wisdom, spared three Japanese cities so that they could be destroyed with single bombs instead of multiple ones. Then, just as the Russians destroyed the Japanese army in Manchuria, America obliterated two of the remaining three cities on the Japanese mainland. Japan surrendered, obviously due to that last bit of bombing. Thanks be to God that Truman had the wisdom to retain a few cities to nuke! If he had incinerated them with conventional bombs, there wouldn't have been anything left to drop an atomic bomb on, and an invasion of Japan, costing a hundred thousand American lives, would have been inevitable.

Then came the Korean war. North Korea was so saturated with bombs that the few trees left standing were each given individual commemorative plaques by the North Korean government. America mysteriously lost, despite the undeniable supremacy of strategic bombing.

Then came Vietnam. First, we bombed the enemy until there was nothing left to bomb. That didn't work. Looking for something, anything, to turn the ultimate weapon against, we started bombing neutral countries. That didn't work. Then we started bombing our South Vietnamese allies. That didn't work either. We lost.

Flash-forward to Gulf War II. How will the free-willed pinnacle of creation handle this one, with the painful lessons of Vietnam still seared upon their collective memory? It's obvious: they'll launch a blitzkrieg- re-branded "Shock and Awe"- and bomb the absolute kajingus out of Iraq. After such a massive bombardment, controlling the country will certainly be a cakewalk, right?

And what's the big issue in the news today? Bush is trying to get us all wound up over Iran.

* This blog is not associated with or paid for by H. Bruce Franklin in any way.

1 Comments:

Blogger Twistycat said...

I think it is an oversimplification to consider strategic bombing as a monolithic enterprise. Strategic bombing has proven extremely effective in the past and has been an essential component of a US military planning since WW2.

There are two components to SB that bear consideration in this debate. The first is the use of SB against infrastructure and the second is the employment of SB against massed troop formations. Both of these elements have undergone a considerable theory evolution since their first widespread employment during the Second World War and both can be successfully employed today in a modern combat theater provided that proper consideration is given to the objectives.

I primarily address the issue of infrastructure and the inherent strengths and weaknesses that limit its application. The first consideration in the employment of SB against infrastructure must be that there is sufficiently developed infrastructure to bomb in the first place. The bombing campaign against the Ruhr Valley, while elaborate and lengthy, did not attain the hoped-for decisive limitation of Germany’s ability to materially prosecute its war aims. It was not until the shift in target selection priority to oil fields, production capability and transport capability that a decisive material advantage could be obtained.

The employment of atomic weapons against Japan fits neatly into the monstrous mold of SB as well. The strategy was not directed at Japan however, but the Soviet Union. By August 1945, maneuvering was well underway against the Soviets and a decisive display of American power represented by the coda of the mushroom cloud was strategically useful in that context. It was well-understood by US policy makers that Japan would not require an invasion. Internal studies conducted by the pentagon concluded that Japan would collapse without invasion, within 6 months and it was understood in the State Department that Japan would surrender if the Emperor was allowed to remain a figurehead. (which he was) Japan was very nearly blockaded by early spring 1945 and without infusions of oil, significant transport ability, or food produced in Manchuria, Japan had no prospects whatsoever of long term resistance. Ultimately Japan’ surrender was likely predicated upon the entry of the Soviet Union into the conflict rather than the employment of atomic weapons against civilian targets.

Flash forward to Vietnam which illustrates the limitations of SB. During this conflict, very few of the target requirements for SB are ever met. There was little valuable infrastructure that could be targeted and very few massed troop formations were ever assembled. Instead, thousands of tons of ordinance were dropped on easily repaired unpaved tracks and bronze age hamlets. If the material expended by one combatant to destroy the infrastructure of the other combatant far exceeds the value of that being destroyed, it is a grossly ineffective strategy and likely doomed to failure. It should be noted that a large majority of the ordinance dropped during the conflict in Indochina was ultimately in South Vietnam and primarily against civilian or irregular targets.

The experience of Vietnam continued to drive the evolution of bombing away from strategic employment towards tactical, where it largely remains today. Bombing conducted today is by a very wide margin of a tactical nature, supporting combat troops in theater. This does not however preclude strategic bombing. The first gulf war should be viewed as a very effective employment of SB. Large formations of entrenched troops were rendered combat-ineffective by intensive bombing and Iraq’s warfighting capabilities were virtually annihilated in the horrendous massacre that occurred during the retreat towards Basra, both of these campaigns falling clearly in the realm of SB. Furthermore, SB is now employed to selectively target elements of defensive networks with precision guided munitions that allow the degradation of defensive capability while limiting domestic political liability from civilian casualties.

There is a deeply unfortunate side effect to this. The US is now able to leverage immense military force on unprecedented levels. Such publicly demonstrated capabilities and clear examples such as the savage mass-murder of fleeing troops on the road to Basra will shape future conflicts and deter opponents from engaging in traditional warfare with the US and it’s client states. Overwhelming force on one side, requires an asymmetrical approach that lends to creating scenarios where SB and even TB are of limited effectiveness. Irregular troops, lack of centralized command & control elements make for “target-poor” environments. The result of this evolution will be a continuance in the trend in the shift of targets from military to civilian. This trend has been proceeding apace since WW2 and shows no sign of abatement. The theory behind it is quite simple: If the military ability of an enemy cannot be readily destroyed, than the popular support from the civilian population that supports said military ability becomes the only viable target.

11:49 AM  

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